Interaction sheaves on continuous domains

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Interaction sheaves on continuous domains. / Abdou, Joseph; Keiding, Hans.

I: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Bind 45, Nr. 11, 2009, s. 708-719.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Abdou, J & Keiding, H 2009, 'Interaction sheaves on continuous domains', Journal of Mathematical Economics, bind 45, nr. 11, s. 708-719. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.005

APA

Abdou, J., & Keiding, H. (2009). Interaction sheaves on continuous domains. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 45(11), 708-719. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.005

Vancouver

Abdou J, Keiding H. Interaction sheaves on continuous domains. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2009;45(11):708-719. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.005

Author

Abdou, Joseph ; Keiding, Hans. / Interaction sheaves on continuous domains. I: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2009 ; Bind 45, Nr. 11. s. 708-719.

Bibtex

@article{b000d2e0158211df803f000ea68e967b,
title = "Interaction sheaves on continuous domains",
abstract = "We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider game forms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding [Abdou, J., Keiding, H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 243-260].",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, solvability, effectivity, acyclicity",
author = "Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding",
note = "JEL classification: C70; D71",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.005",
language = "English",
volume = "45",
pages = "708--719",
journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",
issn = "0304-4068",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "11",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Interaction sheaves on continuous domains

AU - Abdou, Joseph

AU - Keiding, Hans

N1 - JEL classification: C70; D71

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider game forms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding [Abdou, J., Keiding, H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 243-260].

AB - We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider game forms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding [Abdou, J., Keiding, H., 2003. On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. Mathematical Social Sciences 46, 243-260].

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - strong equilibrium

KW - solvability

KW - effectivity

KW - acyclicity

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.005

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.005

M3 - Journal article

VL - 45

SP - 708

EP - 719

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

SN - 0304-4068

IS - 11

ER -

ID: 17520662