Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?

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Standard

Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory? / Grünbaum, Thor; Kyllingsbæk, Søren.

I: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Bind Volume 11, Issue 2, 06.2020, s. 385-404.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Grünbaum, T & Kyllingsbæk, S 2020, 'Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?', Review of Philosophy and Psychology, bind Volume 11, Issue 2, s. 385-404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5

APA

Grünbaum, T., & Kyllingsbæk, S. (2020). Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Volume 11, Issue 2, 385-404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5

Vancouver

Grünbaum T, Kyllingsbæk S. Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory? Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 2020 jun;Volume 11, Issue 2:385-404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5

Author

Grünbaum, Thor ; Kyllingsbæk, Søren. / Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?. I: Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 2020 ; Bind Volume 11, Issue 2. s. 385-404.

Bibtex

@article{f95c38ff559c4a40a70e4aa5e4fba027,
title = "Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?",
abstract = "When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of memory, Rationality, Faculty of Social Sciences, computational model, Prospective memory",
author = "Thor Gr{\"u}nbaum and S{\o}ren Kyllingsb{\ae}k",
year = "2020",
month = "6",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5",
language = "English",
volume = "Volume 11, Issue 2",
pages = "385--404",
journal = "Review of Philosophy and Psychology",
issn = "1878-5158",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is Remembering to do a Special Kind of Memory?

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

AU - Kyllingsbæk, Søren

PY - 2020/6

Y1 - 2020/6

N2 - When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.

AB - When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent’s intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Philosophy of action

KW - Philosophy of memory

KW - Rationality

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - computational model

KW - Prospective memory

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5

DO - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5

M3 - Journal article

VL - Volume 11, Issue 2

SP - 385

EP - 404

JO - Review of Philosophy and Psychology

JF - Review of Philosophy and Psychology

SN - 1878-5158

ER -

ID: 241752001