Political and judicial checks on corruption: evidence from American state governments
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Standard
Political and judicial checks on corruption : evidence from American state governments. / Alt, James E.; Lassen, David Dreyer.
I: Economics & Politics, Bind 20, Nr. 1, 2008, s. 33-61.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Political and judicial checks on corruption
T2 - evidence from American state governments
AU - Alt, James E.
AU - Lassen, David Dreyer
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.
AB - This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - korruption
KW - politiske institutioner
KW - magtens tredeling
KW - corruption
KW - political institutions
KW - separation of powers
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x
M3 - Journal article
VL - 20
SP - 33
EP - 61
JO - Economics and Politics
JF - Economics and Politics
SN - 0954-1985
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 3941584