Strategic Self-Ignorance
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
Dokumenter
- Strategic Self-Ignorance
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We examine strategic self-ignorance—the use of ignorance as an excuse to overindulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to one’s future self. Our model shows that guilt aversion provides a behavioral rationale for present-biased agents to avoid information about negative future impacts of such activities. We then confront our model with data from an experiment using prepared, restaurant-style meals — a good that is transparent in immediate pleasure (taste) but non-transparent in future harm (calories). Our results support the notion that strategic self-ignorance matters: nearly three of five subjects (58 percent) chose to ignore free information on calorie content, leading at-risk subjects to consume significantly more calories. We also find evidence consistent with our model on the determinants of strategic self-ignorance.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Udgivelsessted | Lund |
Udgiver | Department of Economics, Lund University |
Antal sider | 37 |
Status | Udgivet - 2013 |
Navn | Working Paper Department of Economics, Lund University |
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Nummer | 2013:17 |
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