Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

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Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.

In: Avant, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2020, p. 1-22.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Lo Presti, PUE 2020, 'Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality', Avant, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 1-22. https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.02.12

APA

Lo Presti, P. U. E. (2020). Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality. Avant, 11(2), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.02.12

Vancouver

Lo Presti PUE. Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality. Avant. 2020;11(2):1-22. https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2020.02.12

Author

Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico. / Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality. In: Avant. 2020 ; Vol. 11, No. 2. pp. 1-22.

Bibtex

@article{d18d4bbe9f4b46598a1aeccb044f6bbc,
title = "Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality",
abstract = "This paper argues that first-person singular I- and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I–You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I- and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations ob-tain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional {\textquoteleft}I{\textquoteright} independently of entering the I–You, and when they do so they are an intentional {\textquoteleft}we.{\textquoteright}",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Intentionality, individuality, intersubjectivity, normativity, collectivity, autonomy, authority, inferentialism",
author = "{Lo Presti}, {Patrizio Ulf Enrico}",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.26913/avant.2020.02.12",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "1--22",
journal = "Avant",
issn = "2082-6710",
publisher = "The Centre for Philosophical Research",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality

AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - This paper argues that first-person singular I- and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I–You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I- and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations ob-tain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional ‘I’ independently of entering the I–You, and when they do so they are an intentional ‘we.’

AB - This paper argues that first-person singular I- and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I–You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I- and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations ob-tain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional ‘I’ independently of entering the I–You, and when they do so they are an intentional ‘we.’

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Intentionality

KW - individuality

KW - intersubjectivity

KW - normativity

KW - collectivity

KW - autonomy

KW - authority

KW - inferentialism

U2 - 10.26913/avant.2020.02.12

DO - 10.26913/avant.2020.02.12

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

SP - 1

EP - 22

JO - Avant

JF - Avant

SN - 2082-6710

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 333305291