Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error
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Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error. / Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Wang, Liangjun.
2017.Research output: Working paper › Research
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error
AU - Markussen, Thomas
AU - Putterman, Louis
AU - Wang, Liangjun
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments.
AB - We present results from a repeated public goods experiment where subjects choose by vote one of two sanctioning schemes: peer-to-peer (informal) or centralized (formal). We introduce, in some treatments, a moderate amount of noise (a 10 percent probability that a contribution is reported incorrectly) affecting either one or both sanctioning environments. We find that the institution with more accurate information is always by far the most popular, but noisy information undermines the popularity of peer-to-peer sanctions more strongly than that of centralized sanctions. This may contribute to explaining the greater reliance on centralized sanctioning institutions in complex environments.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Public goods
KW - sanctions
KW - information
KW - institution
KW - voting
M3 - Working paper
T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)
BT - Governing Collective Action in the Face of Observational Error
ER -
ID: 182540477