Correlated equilibria in homogenous good Bertrand competition
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods and identical marginal costs. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called "Bertrand paradox'' as well as its most general formulation to date. Our proof generalizes to asymmetric marginal costs and arbitrarily many players in the following way: The market price cannot be higher than the second lowest marginal cost in any correlated equilibrium.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
Vol/bind | 57 |
Sider (fra-til) | 31-37 |
ISSN | 0304-4068 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - mar. 2015 |
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