Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes : An Experiment. / Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju.
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2010.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes
T2 - An Experiment
AU - Putterman, Louis
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
AU - Kamei, Kenju
N1 - JEL classification: C91, C92, D71, D72, H41
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.
AB - The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - voluntary contribution
KW - penalty
KW - public good
M3 - Working paper
BT - Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 16913122