Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality. / Jensen, Thomas.
Kbh. : Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet, 2013. s. 27.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality
AU - Jensen, Thomas
N1 - JEL Classification: D72
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Non-revealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that canddates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.
AB - The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Non-revealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that canddates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - electoral competition
KW - candidate quality
KW - information
KW - polarization
KW - uncertainty
M3 - Working paper
T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)
SP - 27
BT - Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality
PB - Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet
CY - Kbh.
ER -
ID: 46766883