Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
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Self-Organization for Collective Action : An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes. / Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.
In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 81, No. 1, 2014, p. 301-324.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Self-Organization for Collective Action
T2 - An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
AU - Markussen, Thomas
AU - Putterman, Louis
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl
N1 - JEL Classification: C92; C91; D03; D71; H41
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, informal sanctions surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.
AB - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, informal sanctions surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Formal sanctions
KW - Informal sanctions
KW - Experiment
KW - Voting
KW - Cooperation
KW - Punishment
U2 - 10.1093/restud/rdt022
DO - 10.1093/restud/rdt022
M3 - Journal article
VL - 81
SP - 301
EP - 324
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
SN - 0034-6527
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 82120154